U.S. BASING IN CENTRAL ASIA

A. INTRODUCTION
The Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have offered varying degrees of assistance to the U.S. global war on terrorism (GWOT), launched in the wake of September 11th. This paper outlines the nature of their responses to the U.S. campaign and details the specifics of military bases currently being used by U.S. forces in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. It also describes potential basing options in Tajikistan, as well as Russian basing plans in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. All of these bases are highlighted in Figure 1 .
The paper then turns to an examination of new U.S. global military basing plans, how the Central Asian states appear to be fitting into these plans, and their broader implications. Indeed, such plans raise a host of strategic issues as they could potentially affect: regional power balances among the Central Asian states; domestic stability in these countries (to include an increase in terrorist activities there-the very threat we seek to eliminate); the effectiveness of existing multilateral security arrangements between the Central Asian states and Russia (and China); and bilateral relations between the United States and Russia, especially as regards our shared interests in the GWOT.
The United States faces a difficult challenge in trying to balance the need for access to these strategically important areas in the GWOT with our interest in standing as a vanguard of liberalization, since such access requires dealing with and supporting repressive and/or autocratic regimes. In the eyes of many observers and U.S. critics, such security relationships could even be seen as another example of the United States propping up repressive, secular regimes that seek to quash the legitimate political aspirations of their Muslim populations. A greater emphasis on relations with Tajikistan, which has allowed opposition representation into its government and open operation of Islamic parties, would help the U.S. counter such arguments. Ultimately, given the nature of the likely basing arrangements in this region and the need to maintain operational security, it still remains unclear whether these relationships will have a positive or negative impact on perceptions of the United States and its strategic objectives in these Central Asian states and in the Muslim world more generally.
B. CENTRAL ASIAN AND RUSSIAN RESPONSES TO OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
The war on terrorism has brought the Central Asian nations front and center in U.S. foreign policy priorities, as evidenced by such activities as a constant parade of U.S. to allow the stationing of ground troops, aircraft, and helicopters at an airbase to be used "in the first instance" for humanitarian and search and rescue operations; through such careful wording, offensive operations are not explicitly ruled out. The relationship was further solidified when, in March 2002, the U.S. and Uzbek governments signed a joint declaration in which the United States affirmed it would regard "with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan." 2 In return, Uzbekistan pledged to undertake political and economic reforms, a pledge which has resulted in only limited, symbolic gestures to date. While the U.S. has been cautious not to offer explicit security guarantees, the Uzbek expectation certainly would be that Kyrgyzstan has needed it to combat terrorist threats on its soil.
Uzbekistan
Immediately after the signing in October 2001 of the U.S.-Uzbek SOFA that allows for the U.S. use of several bases in the country, U.S. military forces began arriving at Karshi-Khanabad airbase, located about 100 miles north of the Afghan border. About 1,500 U.S. troops have been stationed there, primarily from the 10th Mountain Division.
As with Manas, the U.S. has funded upgrades to the facilities at Khanabad, including refurbishing the runway, building other facilities, and erecting a security fence around the base. The fence, however, has had the negative effect of inconveniencing and angering much of the local population.
In contrast to the lease with Kyrgyzstan (which is renewable on a year-to-year basis), the agreement with Uzbekistan does not specify the duration of the U.S. presence, 
D. U.S. GLOBAL BASING PLANS AND CENTRAL ASIA'S ROLE
The Bush administration has announced plans to fundamentally reshape overseas basing of U.S. military personnel. Such changes are necessary due to the changes in the international security environment, the primary focus on the war on terrorism, and the determination to "deter forward in critical regions around the world."
27 These critical regions generally correspond to an "arc of instability" that has been identified as extending through the Caribbean Rim, Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and North Korea. The new basing strategy emphasizes flexibility, forward access, rotating smaller numbers of troops for shorter periods of time, and using equipment that is already left in place. Concomitantly, the heavy presence of U.S. troops in Western Europe and Northeast Asia will be significantly reduced, and new forward operating bases and locations established in other areas of the world.
At forward operating bases, a small contingent of U.S. troops would be stationed to maintain them and the equipment pre-positioned there, for use by troops who would rotate in on an occasional basis for training (perhaps every 6 months or so). Forward operating locations would be even more bare-boned, without any consistent U.S.
presence. These locations would be quickly available for use by U.S. troops in a crisis, based on previous arrangements with the host nation. It seems likely that U.S. facilities in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and perhaps subsequently in Tajikistan would fall into one of these two categories. The likelihood of such plans raises several issues. First, U.S. administration officials have taken pains to repeatedly state the mantra that the U.S. has no plans for "permanent military bases" in Central Asia. But as the United States has learned in numerous other cases (Europe after World War II, Korea, and Saudi Arabia), when it comes to military presence, the provisional has a tendency to slide into the permanent-it is often easier to get U.S. forces into a country than it is to get them out.
The first question thus is how to define "permanent": Will troops remain only so long as military operations are being conducted in Afghanistan? Will they remain until Afghanistan is "stable" (and who would define what is stable)? At what point does the extension of current U.S. agreements with the host nation move from being a temporary arrangement to a more permanent one? In the case of Kyrgyzstan, one of the parties must indicate it wishes to terminate the arrangement 6 months prior to its expiration, or it is automatically extended. In the case of Uzbekistan, the duration of the U.S. presence
appears to be open-ended. If troops are still there in 10 years, for example, does this begin to constitute a permanent presence or simply the extension of a temporary one? Second, how is "military presence" defined: Is it the presence of any number of U.S. troops on the ground, or is there some small number (for maintaining a base) that would not be characterized as a "presence" per se? Alternatively, assuming the current bases are turned into "forward operating locations," there would be no U.S. military presence on a daily basis, but there would still be a base from which the U.S. would (supposedly) be able to conduct military operations, on an as-needed basis.
The administration has asserted that it wants access to bases, including for the long term, rather than a permanent presence. 29 To many observers this would seem to be is the case here, for specific threats means that the ability to count on access to these facilities is much more tenuous than has historically been the case when such access is essentially guaranteed as part of a formal alliance. In turn, a U.S. presence in one form or another will likely raise expectations among the Central Asian nations about a U.S.
commitment to help them address their own regional threats. It is unclear whether the current U.S. administration would readily recognize a "localized" threat in the region as a threat to U.S. interests and therefore one meriting U.S. involvement. These, and a number of other considerations raised in the next section, all need to be put into perspective when considering reliance on some form of forward basing in the region.
E. IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIAN BASING RIGHTS
It is widely understood that the access rights Central Asian states have offered the The argument is made that we continue to push for respect for human rights, democratic elections, freedom of the press, and other symbols of democracy, and we will pursue engagement so long as we see positive trends. Without such steps forward, it is argued, we will withdraw or reduce our level of engagement. The reality indicates that it is difficult to see any evidence of direct linkages between the level of aid offered and Central Asian governments' attempts to reform their repressive practices and policies.
Indeed, President Karimov of Uzbekistan has a long-standing reputation for dictatorship and repression, yet his government has received the largest share of the increased U.S.
aid to the region.
Too often the U.S. government has set aside its stated principles of promoting greater democratic freedom for the sake of remaining engaged with nations of the former Soviet Union. As a result, few of the leaders there really believe we will ever follow up on threats of withdrawing economic or military assistance. Such an approach risks jeopardizing our role as a vanguard of liberalization, and raises serious questions about whether we are not undermining our moral authority. At a minimum, if our credibility is to be restored, it is vital that we draw specific linkages between assistance levels and host nation commitments to (and follow-through on) reforms. These linkages should understandably differentiate among the nations of Central Asia, as each regime differs in the progress it is (or is not) making to move toward press, electoral, speech, and economic freedom.
A common argument in support of such military presence is the value of militaryto-military and military-to-society contacts in building and sustaining U.S. influence.
However, new security concerns that dictate a more "quarantined" approach make such a "secondary" benefit unlikely, if not impossible. Fences have been erected around the bases where U.S. troops are stationed, contact with the local populace is kept to a minimum, and therefore the economic and political benefits to be obtained from a forward U.S. presence are largely lost. Most of the economic benefit is going to people affiliated in one way or another with the government leadership, not to the local community. In the case of Central Asian basing rights, this situation is further compounded by the likelihood that, in the longer term, the U.S. presence at these facilities will be only nominal.
The lack of an economic boon to the local population, coupled with the lack of personal contact, will only raise more questions about "real" U.S. motivations and exacerbate the resentment that many have of the U.S. propping up corrupt, dictatorial regimes, thus undermining rather than enhancing U.S. influence at grassroots level.
Indeed, by solidifying the positions of current government officials through frequent regional threats, the latter strictly for Operation Enduring Freedom), the key ultimate objective of both is the same: to eliminate the threat from international terrorist groups.
The proximity of these bases raises important questions about sharing airspace rights, demands on local infrastructure, communication requirements, etc. Any number of factors can reduce or eliminate the current cooperative nature of the U.S.-Russian relationship on fighting terrorism, especially in this region.
Finally, there appear to be some expectations that training in such areas as Central Asia and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria and Romania are two frequently named future basing locations) will be easier in the sense of having fewer restrictions imposed by the host nation governments on these training activities.
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While environmental and other regulations may not be as strict in these countries as is currently the case in Germany, for example, it should be kept in mind that these nations either are European Union-aspirants and/or (as in the case of Central Asia) are very environmentally conscious, having suffered through a Soviet system that destroyed large parts of their ecosystems. Training restrictions might be more flexible at the moment, but such flexibility should not be assumed for the future.
F. CONCLUSIONS
The United States has a number of motivations for maintaining some form of military basing capability in the Central Asia region. In addition to the clearly articulated need to have locations closer to areas of future threats, there is no doubt that such a presence also offers opportunities to balance Russian influence in the region (which is particularly welcomed by Uzbekistan), to assert U.S. "claims" to valuable energy resources in these countries, and to diversify reliance on traditional basing partners in Western Europe and Asia.
When considering the Central Asian nations in future global basing plans, it will be vital to consider the balance of interests among the factors outlined above. A careful weighting of priorities may well result in a decision that basing access in these countries offers more benefits than drawbacks. If so, every effort must be made to perpetuate broader U.S. objectives in the region as well, and to make our presence and continued economic and security support conditional on reforms that will move these societies toward more open and free processes. 
